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RECENT CASES
the benefit to the third person is indirect, if it springs from a performance agreed to be rendered to the promisee, then the third
party is only an incidental beneficiary and not entitled to sue on the
contract.
Weston R. Christopherson

EMINENT DOMAIN-DETERMINATION OF MARKET VALUE"GOING BUSINESS" AS ELEMENT OF VALUE. The city of Dallas
instituted condemnation proceedings to secure a portion of the business property of the defendants for the purpose of widening a 20-foot
gravelled roadway into a 40-foot concrete street. The trial court
excluded expert testimony as to the value of defendant's grocery and
liquor business, based among other elements on gross sales and net
operating profit, on the ground that damage to a business is not a
proper element of compensation. Upon appeal it was held, with one
justice dissenting, that a "going business" is property for which recovery can be had in eminent domain proceedings and that the
evidence should have been admitted. The error beine prejudicial, a
reversal was ordered. Priolo v. City of Dallas, 234 S.W.2d 1014 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1950).
It has generally been held in the absence of statute, that the 5th
amendment of the Federal constitution and similar provisions in state
constitutions do not require that compensation be paid where a business is injured or destroyed in connection with the taking of property
for public use under eminent domain proceedings.'
Thus injury to
a business is generally considered damnum absque injuria' either on
the theory that there is no taking and the owner is free to carry on
his business elsewhere,' or that a business is less tangible in nature
than the rights which the constitution undertakes to protect.' However,.it is proper for a government to pay going concern value where
it intends to utilize the business and where the owner is, by the
monopolistic nature of the enterprise, deprived of the right to carry
on the business elsewhere.'
The rationale of the so-called public
utility cases-that when the taking has the inevitable effect of depriving the owner of the going concern value of his business there
has been a compensable taking of property-has been applied to a
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United States v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266 (1943); Mitchell v. United
States, 267 U.S.- 341 (1925); United States v. Stephenson Brick Co., 110
F.2d 360 (5th Cir. 1940). For an outline of the various constitutional
provisions see Lewis, Eminent Domain §15 et seq. (3rd ed. 1909). For
an excellent article describing the growth of the concept of "property" in
eminent domain proceedings see 41 Yale L.J. 221 (1931).
Oakland v. Pacific Coast Lumber & Mill Co., 171 Cal. 392, 153 Pac. 705
(1916).
Mitchell v. United States, 267 U.S. 341 (1925); Cobb v. Boston, 109
Mass. 438, 444 (1872); Ranlet v. Concord Ry., 62 N.H. 561, 564

(1883).

Sawyer v. Commonwealth, 182 Mass. 245, 65 N.E. 52 (1902).
Omaha v. Omaha Water Co. 218 U.S. 180, 202 (1910), (municipal
water system taken); Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148
U.S. 312, 337-341 (1893)
(lock and dam appropriated); Lebanon &
Nashville Turnpike Co. v. Creveling, 159 Tenn. 147, 17 S.W.2d 22, 26
(1929), (toll turnpike condemned for public highway use).
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non-public utility case where there was merely a temporary taking.'
A legislative body is also competent to enact special legislation allowing compensation for injury to business when it feels that justice
requires it,' as where a watershed is taken and a whole community
iswiped out.'
It has been suggested that where state constitutions provide
that property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without
just compensation, that the addition of the word "damaged" could be
interpreted to allow recovery for such intangibles as injuries to
business," but the courts have not attached this significance to the
provision." Indeed even where a statute provided in part: "The jury
shall determine the compensation proper to be made to the owners
and persons interested for the taking or affecting of such real property or damage to business conducted thereon," it was held that this
provision did not entitle a landowner an additional element of
damages; but that its sole effect was to authorize compensation for
one who suffered damage to a business conducted on another person's
land for which he could not, apart from the statute, recover any compensation.'
In any event, the instant decision cannot be explained by this
reasoning because Texas courts have held that "taken" as used in
Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 13 (1949) (compen,
sation allowed for laundry trade routes). See for law review treatment
4 Wyo. L.J. 133 (1949). But see, holding that injury to a business is
not compensable where the taking is temporary or where a fee is condemned, United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 383
(1945).
Joslin Manufacturing Co. v. Providence, 262 U.S. 668, 675 (1923);
State v. Stabb, 226 Ind. 319, 79 N.E.2d 392, 394 (1948); People ex rel.
Burhans v. City of New York, 198 N.Y. 439, 92 N.E. 18 (1910).
Earle v. Commonwealth, 180 Mass. 579, 63 N.E. 10 (1902).
4 Wyo. L.J. 133, 134 (1949).
10 United States v. General Motors Corp. 323 U.S. 373, 380 (1945):
"Even when state constitutions command that compensation be made
for property 'taken or damaged' for public use, as many do, it has generally been held that that which is taken or damaged is the group of
rights which the so-called owner exercises in his dominion of the physical
thing, and that damage to those rights of ownership does not include
losses to his business or other consequential damage." St. Louis K. &
N.W. Ry. v. Knapp, Stout & Co., 160 Mo. 396, 61 S.W. 300, 304
(1901) (". . . the purpose of the words 'or damaged' . . . . was not to
add new elements to the 'just compensation' guaranteed by the constitution . . ."). In at least the following states recovery for injury to a business is denied although the constitutions provide for compensation for
"damage" as well as taking: California, Cal. Const. Art. I, §14, Morris
v. City and County of San Francisco, 59 Cal. App. 364, 210 Pac. 824
(1922); Georgia, Ga. Const. Art. I, §3, Pause v. Atlanta, 98 Ga. 92, 26
S.E. 489 (1896); Illinois, Ill. Const. Art. II, §13, Chicago v. Farwell et
al., 286 Ill. 415, 121 N.E. 795 (1918); Virginia, Va. Const. Art. IV,
§58, Chairman of Highway Comm. v. Parker, 147 Va. 25, 136 S.E. 496
(1927). For a decision construing "or damage" as allowing recovery in
instances where there has been no direct physical injury or taking, as
where an owner's property is adversely affected by the construction of
a viaduct on a publicly owned street see Rigney v. Chicago, 102 Ill. 64
(1881). Accord: Chicago v. Taylor, 125 U.S. 161 (1888); King v. Stark
County et al., 67 N.D. 260, 271 N.W. 771 (1937); Tidewater Ry. v.
Shartzer, 107 Va. 562, 565, 59 S.E. 407, 411 (1907).
"
Morrison v. Cottonwood Development Co., 38 Wyo. 190, 266 Pac. 117,
123 (1928).
6
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the Federal constitution and "taken, damaged, or destroyed" as used
in the Texas constitution' are synonymous and convertible terms. 3
The bold holding of the instant case that business is property and
compensable under eminent domain proceedings is directly contra to
the great majority of decisions and to another late Texas decision 4
holding that where the whole of a tract is taken injury to a business
is not compensable. In still another Texas case" where part of a
tract was taken for street widening purposes, the injury to the business was held to be compensable under eminent domain proceedings,
although recovery was denied on other grounds, the court relying
on Hart Bros. v. Dallas County" which is also cited as authority in
the instant case. Recovery was allowed in the Hart Bros. case for
losses to a business resulting not from the taking of any part of the
land but from an obstruction of the approach to plaintiff's
establishment, based on the authority of prior cases of a similar ' nature and
on civil cases between private persons which had allowed recovery
for losses to a business through such obstruction.'
The Texas court seems to have ignored the essential distinction
which generally sets eminent domain proceedings apart from all
others. In City of LaGrange v. Pieratt the court stated that the same
rule applies to condemnation proceedings as applies where a breach
of contract or a tort results in damages to an established business."
Logically, this argument could be extended to cover cases where a
business is injured by the taking of an entire tract. There seems to
be little reason for compensating business losses where only a portion
of the property is taken but denying recovery when an entire tract
is taken" and where the business has been moved elsewhere or destroyed.
However, in view of the holding in Reeves v. City of Dallas,' it seems probable that if in the future a claim should be made
for compensation for injury to an established business when an entire tract is taken, the instant case would be limited to its facts
(partial taking), and recovery denied by a Texas court.
It has been very widely held, contra to the instant case, that
business losses are non-compensable and that evidence of profits
derived from a business is too speculative and remote to be admitted
for detemining the market value of property in eminent domain pro"Tex. Const. Art. I, §17.
is Reeves v. City of Dallas, 195 S.W.2d 575, 583 (Tex. 1946).
24 Id. at 584.
City of LaGrange v. Pieratt, 142 Tex. 23, 175 S.W.2d 243 (1943).
279 S.W. 1111 (Tex. Comm. App. 1926).
Powell v. H. & T. C. Ry., 104 Tex. 219, 135 S.W. 1153 (1911).
American Construction Co. v. Caswell, 141 S.W. 1013 (Tex. Civ. App.
1911), and cases there cited. Many states allow compensation for losses
to business as a result of breach of contract or tort where damages occasioned by the loss are reasonably capable of ascertainment by competent
proof. See e.g. Roseland v. Phister Mfg. Co., 125 F.2d 417 (7th Cir.
1942); Hoag v. Jenan, 86 Cal. App. 542, 195 P.2d 451, 455 (1948);
City of Corning v. Iowa-Nebraska Light & Power Co., 225 Iowa 1380,
282 N.W. 791, 796 (1938).
City of LaGrange v. Pieratt, 142 Tex. 23, 175 S.W.2d 243 (1943).
Illinois, however, makes such a distinction on this basis, allowing recovery
where only a part of the tract is taken and injury results to a business
on the remainder, and denying it where the entire tract is taken. Chicago
v. Callendar, 396 Ill. 371, 71 N.E.2d 643, 648 (1947); Chicago v. Koff,
341 Ill. 520, 173 N.E. 666, 669 (1930). Research has disclosed no other
jurisdictions in which a distinction has been drawn on this basis.
21
195 S.W.2d 575 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946).
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ceedings,1- because profits of a business depend upon capital invested,
general business conditions, and the skill and business capacity of the
owners." This reasoning is undoubtedly sound if business losses are
non-compensable.
If, however, it is conceded that injury to a business is compensable, as the instant case holds, there ought to be no quarrel with the
admission of such evidence and a showing of its effect on the market
value of the property. In fact, where income such as rents and profits is derived from the intrinsic nature of the property itself, and
not from a business conducted thereon, such income is an element
to be considered in determining market value." And where the
business itself is being taken by the condemning authority, "' or being
paid for by statutory command," or where there is no other means
of determining market value2' evidence of profits has been admitted
as having probative value.
It is submitted that fundamental changes in policy with regard
to allowing recovery for business losses in eminent domain proceedings, where the principle of denial is so universally accepted, should
probably be wrought by legislative enactment rather than by judicial
decision.
Thomas D. Butler
JUDGMENTS-CONSENT TO JURISDICTION-USE OF HIGHWAY
BY NON-RESIDENT MOTORIST AS WAIVER OF FEDERAL
VENUE STATUTE. Plaintiffs, residents of Minnesota, were passengers in the vehicle of defendant A who was a resident of California.
This vehicle collided in Nebraska with that of defendant B, residents
of Iowa. Plaintiff sued in federal court in Nebraska, serving defendant B personally and defendant A by substituted service pursuant to
the provisions of the Nebraska non-resident motorist statute.' Defendant A appeared specially to object to venue and requested dismissal as to him. Plaintiffs moved to dismiss this motion and
requested transfer of the case to the District of Minnesota. In
asserting its jurisdiction and retaining the trial, the court held that
mere use of Nebraska roads by defendant A constituted a waiver of
the federal venue privilege 2 Kostamo v. Brorby, 95 F. Supp. 806
(D. Neb. 1951).
Remedial statutes have been passed in all states in an effort to
impose liability on "hit-and-run" non-resident drivers. New Jersey
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Los Angeles v. Deacon, 119 Cal. App. 491, 7 P.2d 378 (1932); Gauley
& E. Ry. v. Conley, 84 W.Va. 489, 100 S.E. 290, 292 (1919); see note,
7 A.L.R. 164 (1921).
Gauley & E. Ry. v. Conley, supra note 22.
Oregon Mesabi Corp. v. C. D. Johnson Lumber Corp., 169 F.2d 641,
644 (1948) (evidence of profits from ranch and farm lands admissible);
City and County of Denver v. Quick, 108 Colo. 111, 113 P.2d 999, 1001
(1941) (evidence of profit from livestock raising admissible).
Lebanon & Nashville Turnpike Co. v. Creveling, 159 Tenn. 147, 17 S.W.
2d 22, 26 (1929).
In re Board of Water Supply of City of New York, 211 N.Y. 174, 105
N.E. 213 (1914).
In rC State Reservation, 16 Abb. N.C. 159 (N.Y. 1884).
Neb. Rev. Stat. §25-530 (1943) Cum. Supp. (1949).
28 U.S.C. §1391 (a) (a civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only
on diversity of citizenship may.... be brought only in the judicial district where all plaintiffs or defendants reside).

